In this paper the conceptual foundations of restorative practices in education will be scrutinised. Initially, it will be acknowledged that the recent adoption of 'restorative justice' principles in schools is not without promise. However, it will be argued that some attempts to explain: 1) the meaning of restorative justice, and; 2) how restorative practices might contribute to emotion education; are riddled with ambiguity. It will be suggested that a philosophical analysis might help to clear away some of the muddle. In particular, it will first be argued that Johnstone and Van Ness's concept of transformative restoration is logically paradoxical. Their terms encounter and reparation better capture what would seem to be the core functions of restorative justice. However, 'education' probably more aptly describes restorative processes classified as preventative or pro-active. In reference to Aristotle, it will secondly be argued it is not obviously apparent there is a natural state of 'positive' emotion that educational processes can restore pupils to. It will rather be maintained that emotion education should involve helping pupils to learn through various painful and pleasant sentiments (including shame) so that they can moderate these where necessary. It will be concluded that restorative approaches may be able to contribute to such emotional development. Indeed, the merit of restorative practices may become most evident if proponents of it restrict themselves to modest and specific claims about its educational potential.

1.1 Diana and Actaeon

‘Destiny, not guilt, was enough
For Actaeon. It is no crime
To lose your way in a dark wood’ (Hughes, 1997 p 105)

I would like to begin with a myth – one of transformation and restoration. A myth that involves anger at a sleight perceived, and shame from the excessive nature of the retaliation. In book III of Ovid’s Metamorphoses (2008), the poet recounts the tale of Actaeon, who, tired from the days hunting in the woods, stumbles into a cavern. In the cavern is a waterfall and pool where the Goddess Diana secretly bathes under the watchful protection of her nymphs. Diana becomes enraged with Actaeon upon spotting him peering towards her unclothed body. She hurls some water in the huntsman’s face and challenges him to tell anyone else how he came to see her naked. Upon Diana’s words Actaeon undergoes metamorphoses. He sprouts a rack of antlers, hooves replace his hands and powerful legs

1 This is a draft version only. For any correspondence please contact the author at s9801301@sms.ed.ac.uk
his arms - he swiftly turns into a stag. Dizzied with shame at his unexpected transformation he leaps, terror stricken, back into the forest. There he finds the pack of hounds he used to lead on in the hunt. Now being without voice he cannot call them off. In a bitter irony the hounds savagely catch, kill and eat their former master unaware of who he so recently was. Only then, it is said did, the remorseless anger of Diana find peace (Hughes, 1997, p 112). Only with violent retribution was her anger restored to calm².

The ancient parable of Actaeon may seem like an odd place to start a discussion on the nature, and possible benefits of, restorative approaches in schools. However, I believe the poem can help to bring home (albeit somewhat fantastically) the harm that can result when someone vengefully reacts to feelings of anger, in a reckless and disproportionate way. After all, Actaeon did not as Hughes³ puts it ‘commit a crime’; but he suffered the ultimate penalty of his life anyway. It is possible that restorative approaches in schools may be able to help reduce the likelihood of extreme and unjustified actions from angry feelings; especially in instances where harm (apparent or real) is apprehended. It has certainly been claimed that restorative approaches can repair harm (Morrison 2007), restore relationships, and enable a more thoughtful and constructive way of addressing conflict in schools (McCluskey et al, 2007 & Cremin 2010). Indeed, in Scotland it is thought that the main success of restorative approaches was their potential to positively influence relationships within the school community (Kane et al, 2008, p 104). It has also been suggested that restorative practices place particular emphasis on restoring relationships through seeking apology and appropriate reparation rather than punishment (McCluskey et al 2007). Still, while I am broadly sympathetic to the basic idea that creating a safe space for dialogue might improve relationships where they have, for whatever reason, broken down; the theoretical foundations of restorative approaches do seem more than a little unsteady⁴. Cremin gets to the nub of a central conceptual confusion in her paper on the adaptation of restorative practices and principles to schools. Why champion ‘restoration’ when it is far from clear that the harmony sought ever really was in the first place⁵. Why return to a destination whose (moral?) value may now be questionable?

² This is a brief recap of events told much more poetically, first by Ovid (2008) and later by Ted Hughes (1997) and Robin Robertson (2006)
³ In his adaptation of the poem ‘Actaeon’ (Hughes, 1997)
⁴ Cremin (2010) notes Braithwaite’s comment that the literature in relation to restorative justice is ‘immature’ and lacking in ‘theoretical sophistication’.
⁵ It has also been recorded that some Scottish head teachers are beginning to ask ‘what are we restoring to?’ (McCluskey et al, 2008, p 213)
for their own actions…? It is hard to imagine that such communities ever really existed. And if they did, is it really desirable to go back to pre-modern times?” (Cremin, 2010, p 4)

In this paper, I would like to examine the theory that underpins some latter-day accounts of restorative approaches in education. At 1.4 I will reflect upon Cremin’s question: is it really desirable to go back to pre-modern times? It is of course pellucid that we cannot return and live in history, no matter how much we may (or may not) want to. However, I do think that the philosophers of Ancient Athens conceived of the emotions in a nuanced way that might lend clarity to contemporary debate about how to best educate them. The possibility that Plato developed a theory of emotion as ‘restoration’ to a natural state of equilibrium will therefore be considered. At 1.5 an Aristotelian theory of emotion will rather be defended and it will be stressed that shame, emulation and persuasion are all motives through which the young can learn through. It will be suggested that sensitively mediated restorative practices may help to foster virtuous sentiments in school pupils; sentiments that are valuable because of their likely relation to human flourishing. However, at 1.3 it will be maintained that educational practices that are distinctively ‘restorations’ are probably reactive rather than preventative in nature as a ‘restoration’ typically involves responding to and repairing some harm or damage that has already been caused. What though is educational philosophy and how might it help to provide clarity to debate about restorative approaches in education?

1.2 What is Educational Philosophy?

Although a diverse range of famous philosophers since antiquity have turned their hand to educational problems, the philosophy of education did not really emerge as a distinct discipline until the twentieth century (Archambault 1968, Blake et al 2003 & Hirst & Carr 2005). D J O’Connor (1957) was one of the first to employ the methods of philosophical analysis to specifically educational problems. He argued that philosophy was an ‘activity of criticism and clarification’ (O’Connor, 1957, P 4) that could be exercised on any subject matter. The phrase ‘philosophy of education’ refers to ‘those problems of philosophy that are of direct relevance to educational theory’ (O’Connor, 1957, p 14-15). The later groundbreaking work of Richard Peters and Paul Hirst in the United Kingdom in the 1960’s and 1970’s established critical analysis of concepts as the predominant and even paradigmatic style in the philosophy of education (Blake et al 2003). However, the analytic tradition has not been without its critics. Indeed, there has been much recent debate within educational

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7 Ethics and Education (1970) by Peters and the Logic of Education by Hirst and Peters (1975) are paradigmatic examples of philosophical analysis being applied to education.
philosophy over what the field of inquiry is, or perhaps, ought to be⁸. Paul Hirst and Wilfred Carr shared a significant exchange on this subject (Hirst & W Carr, 2005). Hirst affirms that ‘philosophy, like psychology, sociology and history, is an abstracting, academic and theoretical discipline’ that can significantly aid ‘the exercise of practical reason in educational affairs’ (ibid, p 618). In defining educational philosophy in theoretical terms, Hirst rejects the argument of Wilfred Carr, who maintains that educational philosophy is inherently, indeed, exclusively practical. Carr says that the ‘philosophy of education cannot inform educational practice because it is itself a form of practice’ (ibid, p 623). In his rejoinder to Hirst, Carr adds that educational philosophy is: ‘entirely dependent on the willingness of educational practitioners to reflectively recover the unacknowledged prejudices at work in their practical knowledge and understanding’ (ibid, p² 625-626). Hirst does not soften his overall opposition to Carr’s practical philosophy but he does agree that educational philosophy ‘needs educational practitioners’ (ibid, p 630) willing and able to reflect on their own practice. Thus, whereas Hirst maintains that educational philosophy can be undertaken by both philosophers and practitioners, Carr seems to think that it can only be conducted by educational practitioners.

While there is far from contemporary consensus about the precise nature of educational philosophy, in their different ways O’Connor (1957), Archambault (1968), Reid (1968), Best (1968), Peters (1970), Hirst & Peters (1975), Blake et al (2003), Curren (2007) and Holma (2009) all agree that conceptual analysis is one of, if not thee, principal tools at the educational philosophers disposal. In the opening section of Philosophical Analysis and Education (edited by Archambault 1968) Reid and Best present two alternative analytic perspectives of educational philosophy. Best argues that the educational philosopher should be a mere under labourer. He thinks the function of philosophical analysis should be the relatively humble one of systematically erasing ambiguous language from educational theory. Reid however articulates a much more positive account.

‘Philosophy of education will be the use of philosophical instruments, the application of philosophical methods, to questions of education...both the more analytic emphases of philosophy (with linguistics) and the synthetic ones. This is the “philosophy of education.”’ (Reid, 1968, p 26)

Reid suggests that analysis only constitutes half of educational philosophy. As he puts it: ‘analysis is, in fact, one moment, one emphasis, in the strictly indivisible life of philosophy; synthesis is the other moment’ (Reid, 1968, p 24). The purpose of thinking critically about concepts (of breaking them down and putting them together) is to cast light upon

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⁸ A recent issue of the Journal of Philosophy of Education (Ruitenberg, 2009) for example presents a diverse range of views about what it is that philosophers of education do.
⁹ Wilfred Carr makes much the same point in an earlier paper remarking that ‘any satisfactory resolution’ to the discipline’s problems ‘will only be achieved by the philosophy of education’s proficient and experienced practitioners’ (2004, p 70).
educational practice. More recently, Holma (2009) has also argued that educational philosophy should involve a thorough methodological process of analysis and synthesis. She argues that the ‘process of disassembling and reassembling...is...the way of getting access to a new, more profound understanding of the issue’ (Holma, 2009, p 326). What though should educational philosophers be trying to rebuild out of their profounder grasp of concepts? Archambault observes that the synthetic process often leads philosophers to articulate a more coherent set of educational aims. Holma suggests that the newly clarified concepts ought to be fed back into wider educational dialogue. Biesta (2007), Archambault (1968) and Reid (1968) all broadly think that philosophical clarity can support wise practical decision making in education. It seems that a vital function of educational philosophy is to employ logical inquiry to resolve conceptual and linguistic ambiguities where they occur, so as to support the development of sound theory, policy and practice in education. Arguably there are at least two such central ambiguities in the literature of restorative practices and education. It is to these that discussion now turns. First, what is meant by restoration and transformation? Second, how exactly may such restoration and/or transformation support emotion education?

1.3 Philosophical Analysis of ‘Restoration’ and ‘Transformation’

In their chapter entitled ‘The meaning of restorative justice’ (2007) Johnstone and Van Ness maintain that it is ‘a deeply contested concept...there is not likely to be (indeed perhaps should not be) a single conception of restorative justice’ (Johnstone & Van Ness, 2007, p 9). They do nonetheless propose three possible conceptions, implying that each may overlap the other in practice: namely, encounter; reparative; and transformative (Johnstone & Van Ness, 2007, p 17). In the encounter notion the focus is placed upon those involved in a crime meeting and making a collective judgement about the best way to respond to the crime. In the reparative version of restorative justice the emphasis is placed upon the offender repairing the harm caused by the commission of that crime. It is asserted that in 'the transformative conception, restorative justice is conceived as a way of life we should lead’ (Johnstone & Van Ness, 2007, p 15). Johnstone and Van Ness indicate that individual people are all inextricably connected to each other in complex social networks. They seem to construe transformative restoration as an aspiration, as an ideal type of human relation, ‘guided by a vision of transformation of people, structures and our very selves’ (ibid, p 17). What influence though have principles of restorative justice had in education, and what of Van Ness & Johnstone’s suggested concepts in particular?

In the first seminar of this series Cremin suggested that ‘transformative restorative justice is the most ambitious of the concepts and has much to offer’ (2010, p 10); adding that ‘this transformation needs to be grounded in the education of young people’ (ibid, p 8).
However, can *any* educational process (restorative or otherwise) truly ‘transform’ people and social structures and *should* education aspire to such transformations in the first place? What does transformation actually mean and what moreover does restoration? The *Oxford English Dictionary* indicates that to ‘transform’ is to ‘make a thorough and dramatic change in the form of outward appearance or character’ (OED, 1991). It similarly defines a ‘transformation’ as a change in form or ‘metamorphoses’ (OED, 1991). It seems that a person is ‘transformed’ if they become changed into something that they were not previously. In contrast, ‘restorative’ means either a ‘tending to restore to health’ or a bringing ‘back or attempt to bring back to the original state by rebuilding, repairing’ (OED, 1991). Thus restoration and transformation seem to refer to very different processes: the essence of a restoration involves something being *returned to how it was before*, whereas at its core, a transformation entails something *becoming different and new*. Furthermore, while a ‘transformation’ suggests a sudden, swift and perhaps radical alteration, restoration implies a more gradual process. Given these differences it is probable that ‘restoration’ and ‘transformation’ are words that cannot be used to describe the same activity or goal without a distortion of the very meaning of these words. Thus, the very idea of a *transformative restoration* arguably hinges on a logical (or at least a linguistic) paradox.

If restoration and transformation are mutually incompatible descriptive terms, which one captures better the core functions of restorative practices in schools? Morrison (2007) remarks that, by far in a way the most common model of restoration actually employed in schools is a face to face conference, or as Van Ness and Johnstone would put it: an *encounter*. School based encounters might take the form of community or family conferences, or they may involve less formal peer mediation or problem solving circles (ibid, 2007). Morrison adds that schools often adapted the vocabulary employed by the criminal justice system to better reflect the purposes of education. Instead of the terms ‘victim’, ‘crime’ and ‘offender’ schools seemed to prefer to speak of ‘students who have been harmed or caused harm’ (Morrison, 2007). It has similarly been observed that the borrowing of legalistic phrases such as ‘victim’ and ‘perpetrator’ ‘may reinforce a discourse that demonises and criminalises young people’ (McCluskey et al, 2008, p 204). However, in their Scottish study it was found that the emphasis on formal conferencing evident in early restorative approaches in education had been questioned by local authorities and schools (McCluskey et al, 2008). The Scottish view suggested that conferencing might be most apt for serious indiscipline. Indeed, in Scotland there was a notable tendency to focus more on the training and development of existing staff and pupils and less on external facilitators being parachuted in to attend to incidents where significant harm had occurred (McCluskey et al, 2008).
Although Scottish secondary schools tended to perceive restorative approaches as a method for resolving ‘particular incidents where relationships had broken down’ (Kane et al, p 102); primary schools construed such practices as capable of ‘permeating school culture and providing a vehicle for the development of school ethos’ (ibid, p 102). Similarly, Morrison notes that many schools are today adopting ‘pro-active, as well as reactive restorative measures. The broad aim is to build the social and emotional intelligence and skills within the school community’ (2007, p 326). It has also been implied that that restorative approaches might be able to prevent harm from arising in the first place by seeking to promote emotional literacy in pupils (McCluskey et al, 2008). What should be made of these claims; that restorations can be pro-active and preventative? While a process of restoration may perhaps lead to eventual positive change in a person over time10, it certainly appears mistaken to describe individual restorative encounters as ‘transformative’, given the necessarily dramatic nature of a transformation. Furthermore, once educational practices become focussed on the ‘proactive’ rather than the ‘reactive’ they arguably cannot be, at base, ‘restorative’ either. A restoration does after all seem to necessarily require effort to make good some pre-existent harm, damage or deterioration in state. Therefore it seems to me that distinctively restorative approaches to education hinge on: 1) some harm having already been caused and; 2) attempt being made to repair this harm. Arguably, educational encounters specifically designed to restore relationships and/or repair harm caused by conflict may be properly described as restorative. When educational ends become more pro-active however, the term restoration appears to be less apt. This is not to dispute that restorative practices might aid the emotion education of pupils; it is only to say that it is rather perverse to speak of a ‘pro-active restoration’. For a ‘pro-active restoration’ arguably necessitates both the active prevention of deterioration on the one hand and the actual facilitation or permission of such deterioration on the other. Thus, to my mind ‘education’ captures much better than ‘restoration’, the idea of pro-actively cultivating the emotional development of pupils. In this regard what do proponents of restorative approaches mean by ‘emotional intelligence’ and ‘emotional literacy’? How might emotions be restored and/or educated and what emotions should be so restored/and educated?

1.4 Emotions as restorations to a natural state of harmony?

It has been supposed that restorative approaches in schools can help pupils to build emotional skills and intelligence (Morrison 2007, McCluskey et al 2008 & Cremin, 2010). However, to the best of my knowledge there has been relatively little debate in the restorative practices literature about exactly what sort of phenomena the emotions are. Cremin suggests that restorative justice involves an integration of thought and emotion (2010, p 2) for the wider purpose of promoting human flourishing. Her view may not be without promise or

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10 As (McCluskey et al, 2008) do to be sure, broadly suggest.
substance but it does perhaps invite further clarification. Is Cremin here suggesting that a more balanced and moderate integration of thought and feeling is educationally and/or morally desirable; and that restorative approaches might support the emotional education of pupils in something like this way? Or is she rather implying that emotions are, at some important level, unruly, non-moral feelings that are devoid of thought and in need of rational control? While the restorative approaches literature may not provide much specific detail about the sort of emotional intelligence aimed at; Goleman\(^{11}\)’s concept of emotional intelligence has recently come into question. Kristjánsson (2006, 2007) and Macleod et al (2010) have suggested that educators should try to promote *virtuous* rather than *intelligent* emotions. Notably, they claim that emotion-virtues, unlike emotional intelligence involve: 1) proper and moderate, rather than rationally controlled feelings; and 2) actions that have distinctively moral ends. I certainly think it is unhelpful, from an educational perspective, to conceptualise the emotions as mere physiological sensations or disturbances that are divorced from cognition and/or morality. If emotions do not entail mental activity then can they be readily *educated* through dialogue with others? Can conversation about past feelings positively alter a person’s future affection and behaviour? Perhaps, but such dialogue would seem to require some sort of capacity to rationally reflect on feelings and conduct. To be sure, William James (2007) did famously construe the emotions in largely physiological terms. However, in Ancient Athens a very different cognitive theory of emotion was developed.

‘What is characteristic of all emotions is a single feature: namely thought or belief as the efficient cause.’

(Fortenbaugh, 2008, p 116)

In the opening pages of his influential text, *Aristotle on Emotion*, Fortenbaugh (2008) chronicled a period when members of Plato’s academy, including Aristotle, conducted a groundbreaking inquiry into the emotions. The investigation culminated in a theory, fully articulated in Aristotle’s Rhetoric, according to which thought and/or belief came to be construed as ‘efficient causes’ (Fortenbaugh, 2008, p 12) of emotion. Fortenbaugh suggests that the Academy’s investigation of emotion was first evident in Plato’s *Philebus*. Fortenbaugh claims the *Philebus* raises questions about the emotions, but it is Aristotle that directly addresses and answers these questions in the *Rhetoric*. A significant feature of Aristotle’s account, Fortenbaugh argues, was the creation of a new educational theory for the emotions. Frede (1996) however, argued that Plato in the *Philebus* developed a theory of emotion as restoration to the natural state. Given the language used to describe recent ‘restorative practices’ in schools, the theory of emotion Frede attributes to Plato would seem to be of contemporary relevance and interest. In the *Philebus*, Plato does, to be sure, suppose that there is a natural state of harmony in all living creatures that disintegrates when they experience emptiness (*Philebus, 31d-32c*). It is painful, he says, to suffer the decay

\(^{11}\) Goleman is of course, one of the first and arguably the most notable advocates of emotional intelligence.
and destruction of this natural state (Philebus, 42c8-d3). He adds that the pain brought about by the disintegration of the natural state can be removed by the filling up of whatever has been lacking.

Crucially, Plato actually defines *pleasure* at this point, as such a restoration to the natural state. As he puts it, ‘when things are restored to their own nature again, this restoration, as we established in our agreement among ourselves, is pleasure’ (Philebus, 42d5-6). There would appear to be sound textual evidence then, in support of Frede’s declaration that Phileban *pleasures* are ‘always the restoration of some disturbance or the filling of a lack’ (Frede, 1996, p 262). However, Frede’s claim that Plato developed a theory of *emotion as restoration* is less well supported by the text. If Plato did intend to develop a general theory of the emotions in the Philebus, one of its distinctive features would seem to be that they are *free* of bodily feelings – they are entirely cognitive judgements or mental events. Letwin concurs with this reading and observes that Phileban passions are occurrences that are ‘psychological rather than physiological in character’ (1980, p 196). Importantly, I do not think that it is educationally prudent to imply that the emotions are feelings that can be restored to a natural state of harmony. For one, as Letwin (1981) notes, Plato leaves unanswered, in the *Philebus*, the question of whether or not the pleasures Frede takes to be constitutive of emotions are essentially *private* events or *public* ones, specifiable in a shared community of discourse. For another, in the Philebus, pleasures are not so much to be educated but rationally limited. For Aristotle in contrast, moderate emotions were a necessary feature of moral virtue and the exercise of virtue was in turn necessary for the flourishing\textsuperscript{12} life (eudaimonia). Aristotle thought that the emotions are neither free of thought, nor pure thought – but rather, feelings that are infused with thought, and as such, educable. In this respect Cremin (2010, p1) may have done well to base her account of human thriving on Aristotle rather than Seligman. It is arguably unduly restrictive to classify pleasure as ‘positive emotion’. As we shall see in the subsequent section, some emotions that are painful in the short term maybe positive over all. Importantly, Aristotle also maintained that human flourishing requires the exercise of virtue rather than the pursuit of pleasure.

1.5 Educated emotions and the Flourishing life

‘Emotions are those things by the alteration of which men differ with regard to those judgements which pain and pleasure accompany, such as anger, pity, fear and all other such and their opposites.’ (Rhetoric, 1378a24-26, p 141)

In Section 6 of the *Rhetoric* Aristotle discusses in depth a range of emotions: anger, calm, friendship, enmity, fear, confidence, shame, favour, pity, indignation, envy and

\textsuperscript{12} See the Nicomachean Ethics (2004), Kristjánsson (2006 & 2007) and Carr (2009) for explanations of the need for moderate emotions within the virtuous and flourishing life
emulation. To be sure, at least some of these emotions appear to be aiming at some sort of restoration. Calmness for example is defined as the ‘suspension and placation of anger’ (Rhetoric, 1380a8-9). However, Aristotle stipulates that three elements must be present for an emotion to become manifest. He takes the example of anger and says that it must be established, what state persons are in when they are angry, who they are angry with and in what circumstances (Rhetoric, 1378a). Pathos (passion or emotion, taken from the verb to suffer or experience), Konstan suggests, ‘looks to the outside stimulus to which it responds (Konstan, 2007, P 4)’. Arguably, when we suffer emotions, we are at least partly, passive, in regard to them. It is the aspect of passivity that takes them beyond the realm of what we can wholly choose. However, Aristotle holds that an emotion is not just a passive alteration but also a judgement about pleasure and pain. Importantly, these judgements are at least partly cognitive and as such, susceptible to persuasion under the sage advice of others. His emphasis on persuasion not only marks a significant departure from the Phileban view of pleasure and emotion; it also perhaps offers a theory about how restorative approaches like conferencing and/or mediation might enable emotion education through verbal exchange and dialogue.

Unlike Plato, Aristotle seemed to think that our emotions can dispose us to act out of virtue. Kosman (1980) and Kristjánsson (2006 & 2007) both suggest that moral virtue often entails a certain reciprocity between passionate reaction and action (pathos and praxis). To be sure, people may suffer emotions in that they are centrally passive in regard to them, but dispositions of feeling need not be passive. We do not perhaps choose to become angry about something in a specific moment, or during an episode of feeling, but we can shape how we respond to things more broadly, through the habits of feeling we acquire. Sherman & White (2007) have recently suggested that we are more than merely ‘indirectly responsible’ for our emotions, in so far as we choose our dispositions. Our emotional habits, they say, are open to revision in social interaction with others. Sherman & White think Aristotle did not hold the view that people are essentially passive in regard to their emotions; a perspective they say resides implicit in Aristotle’s rhetoric. Indeed, it seems to me that Aristotle regarded persuasion as a quite legitimate educational tool13. To be sure, the Rhetoric does not find Aristotle explicitly stating that persuasion is a means that should be used to aid the development of virtue, in the young. However, Aristotle’s discussion of the role of emotional appeal, in political and legal settings, strongly suggests that he held the view that persuasion could improve the judgements of young people. Moreover, Aristotle seemed to think that we could learn through feelings of shame and emulation14 too.

13Konstan (2007, p 97) and Kristjánsson (2007, p19) also interpret the rhetoric in a similar light.
14 See Kristjánsson (2006b and 2007) for a detailed explanation of why emulation is moral emotion characteristic of learners
Aristotle maintains that shame (aiskhunê) is a type of pain felt when one’s reputation is being, or might be, sullied (Rhetoric 1383b11-15). Shame is at its most acute moreover, when one’s behaviour is witnessed by others (Rhetoric 1384a43-b), especially those that one admires (ibid1384a35-36&1384b37-39). Thus, shame is arguably a distinctively moral emotion that is intimately connected with public standards or norms, of acceptable behaviour. Konstan (2007) argues that in modernity shame has been derided as only a primitive form of guilt. In restorative practices in education it has certainly been suggested that it ‘is clear that notions of shame are not helpful’ (McCluskey, 2008, p 207). However, Aristotle implied that shame is a distinctive virtue of the learner. Through feeling moderate shame young people can arguably become: 1) acquainted with the moral values of their community (moral values that may come to serve them well in the long term) and; 2) moved to act to work towards acquiring these values themselves. Thus there is perhaps a need to distinguish between excessive public shaming and feeling justified shame. Crippling, cruel public shaming of the sort experienced by Actaeon would seem to have no place in schools, but justified and tolerable shame might be morally educational. In any case, shame would not appear to be an emotion that is inherently unhelpful in education. Far from it: feelings of shame that are justified, comparatively mild and understood (by teacher and pupil alike) may actually move pupils to change their future actions in more ethically desirable directions. While I would certainly not want to suggest that emotion education (and restorative approaches that may support this) should be restricted to the cultivation of shame, I do not think this emotion should be considered off limits either. For Aristotle, human thriving involved the moderate experience of a range of pleasant and painful emotions. He importantly thought that some painful emotions (like shame) are educational and valuable because of their particular capacity to engender long term human flourishing.

1.6 Transformation, restoration or old fashioned education?

In this paper it has been argued that some present day attempts to formulate a concept of restorative justice have failed to convince. It has been suggested that: 1) the notion of a transformative restoration is logically paradoxical 2) the idea of a pro-active

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15 Konstan remarks that shame has a fundamentally ethical character (2007, p 104)
16 See Burnyeat (1980) and Kristjánsson (2007) for discussion of how shame is a semi-virtue of the learner
17 Indeed, even if shame should not be directly cultivated by educators it seems to me that some pupils may experience it anyway. Surely in such cases it would be educational to help pupils understand this shame and put it in the right perspective.
18 Indeed, when educators utter phrases such as ‘I am disappointed in your behaviour’ they are perhaps trying to instil feelings of the shame in the person concerned in the hope that this shame will be morally educationally; in the hope that the same behaviour will not be repeated again. If such phrases are uttered sensitively and with genuine concern for the person involved then the shame invoked need not, it seems to me, become damaging or excessive.
restoration is ill-considered. However, it has also been suggested that restorative approaches may, in practice, be able to contribute to a broader Aristotelian sentimental education. It is hoped the philosophical clarifications offered here will be perceived by practitioners not as a ‘sniping from the sidelines’; but rather as an attempt to engage in dialogue so as to strengthen the theoretical foundations of the field. In this respect it seems to me that advocates of restorative justice might be well advised to make modest and specific claims about what distinctively restorative approaches might realistically achieve in schools. Much of the actual practices described as ‘transformative’ and/or ‘pro-active’ might be more aptly characterised by a much older word - education. In fairness, to Johnstone and Van Ness, they do acknowledge there may be ‘other and better names’ (2007, p 20) to describe the concept of restorative justice than the ones they put forward. In the case of transformation I would be particularly inclined to agree. By their very rapid nature, transformations, for good or ill, tend to only occur in mythology.

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