Source: (2008) Cornell International Law Journal. 41(2):675-737.

Building on this basic intuition, this article undertakes to further consider the idea of a "different kind of justice," one that is less vindictive and state-centered and is more caring and responsive to human suffering. In doing so, it relies on the concept of justice as recognition-the kind of justice that is involved in giving due recognition to the pain and humiliation experienced by victims of collective violence. Recognition here is essentially individual-centered. Unlike restorative approaches to justice, which emphasize the restoration of communal bonds, recognition focuses primarily on the individual's sense of injustice and threatened self-respect, drawing a clear line between such matters of justice and other moral concerns (including democracy, peace, or reconcihation). This focus may enable us to gain a deeper understanding of the moral dilemmas and needs arising in the aftermath of genocide or barbarous civil wars. Rather than confining the debate on transitional justice to the simplistic either/or choice of "retribution versus restoration," this approach makes room for a broader, more critical, and sensitive outlook by asking how injustice looks to the victims.(excerpt)