Source: (2007) In Jon Miller and Rahul Kumar, ed., Reparations: Interdisciplinary Inquiries, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, Pp. 280-306.

"...In this exploratory chapter, I want to examine the moral basis of these demands for reparatons with regard to colonialism. Specifically, I am interested in the kinds of claims that independent sovereign nations have on account of their past colonial subjection. The claims of formerly colonized nations are quite distinct from the claims for reparations by indigenous peoples who have been colonized. ...I begin by recalling some common remarks about the injustice of colonialism (Section 12.1). Given that the demands made in the name of reparations presented in paragraph 116 of the Draft Resolution are also demands that arguably could be made in the name of global distributive equality, it might be thought that arguments from reparations are superfluous and that arguments from equality can do all the justificatory work. I will suggest, however, that reparative arguments can supplement arguments from equality; that they may even be necessary if egalitarian justice is to be realized; and that they can substitute for egalitarian arguments when the latter are resisted (Section 12.2). I then ask if the case for colonial reparations can satisfy the central philosophical issues that any account of reparations must confront (Section 12.3)." (excerpt)