Source: (2013) Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law. 46:1041-1077.

This Article proceeds in four Parts. Part II discusses informal dispute resolution and notes the importance of informal dispute resolution in certain societies where third-party counterinsurgencies are ongoing.24 Part III provides evidence that targeting by the United States has had an adverse impact on informal dispute resolution, although it concedes that the exact nature and extent of that impact is unclear. Part IV outlines the stewardship model and the legal support for an implied-safe conduct theory. It then sketches the theory's operation. This Part also includes discussion of the consequences of the implied-safe conduct approach for two new types of war fighting: drone signature strikes and autonomous systems in which computers make certain decisions without ex ante human review. Part V discusses some objections, including the concern that the implied-safe conduct approach, like the protective model, unduly constrains commanders' decisions. (excerpt)