Source: (2008) Chicago-Kent Journal of International and Comparative Law. 8(1): 1-31.

Also, United States Judge McDonald's replacement of Judge Cassese as President of the ICTY added to the momentum for change, as she was in strong favor of increasing the use of plea-bargaining at the ICTY. ... The ICTY considers that the use of plea-bargaining does not hinder the establishment of the truth, and in fact, it has repeatedly affirmed that guilty pleas are an important and direct contribution to the truth-finding function of the Tribunal. ... Plea-Bargaining from the Victim's and the Accused's Perspective The paramount goal of international criminal tribunals is to convict and punish those most responsible for committing war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. ... The Rome Statute makes some accommodation for these conflicting interests in Article 65(4), under which the Trial Chamber may request that the prosecutor present additional evidence, including the testimony of witnesses, or even order the trial to be continued under the ordinary trial procedures if it is "of the opinion that a more complete presentation of the facts of the case is required in the interests of justice, in particular in the interests of the victims." ... While I am not able to see behind the curtain of the ICTY, it seems to me that administrative efficiency and judicial economy played a more important role than was admitted in the Nikolic Tribunal's decision to eventually admit plea-bargaining. ... The use of pleabargaining entails the risk of compromising the goals and mandate of international criminal courts, which goes beyond the purposes of domestic criminal proceedings mainly consisting of retribution, deterrence, rehabilitation, and prevention. (Author's Abstract)