Source: (2006) In, Harrman, Margaret S., editor, Handbook of Mediation: Bridging Theory, Research, and Practice. Blackwell Publishing pp.384-392As the chapters in this book amply demonstrate, the model [proposed in chapter 2] is also useful for generating critical discussion around the nature of third party mediation per se. This forms the core of my brief remarks and “notes” on the HHG model in this chapter. But first I want to distinguish the HHG model as (precisely) a model of the mediation process from its role as a theory of mediation. Models may well (as Herrman, Hollett, and Gale claim) generate theories and testable hypotheses, and models are always, at least implicitly, based themselves upon some (at least partial) theories, but it is important not to mistake the model for the theory that undergirds it. As admirably explicit and comprehensive of the mediation process as they HHG model is, it is less so as a fully developed theory of mediation. What theory there is in the HHG model is largely implicit. TO be sure, some of this theory is indirectly revealed in the section in chapter 2 where they describe the basic “assumptions of the model.” These assumptions constitute the taken-for-granted axioms upon which the model is based. Some examples include: “People prefer harmony to discord.” “Competition brings forth competition, cooperation calls forth cooperation.” “Uncertainty motivates an active search for more information.” Such axioms are to be understood as in part ontological: they comprise a “theory” of human nature and universal human psychological functioning. One potential challenge to such assumptions (to all ontological assumptions, in fact) comes from the domain of radical cultural variation – the ethnographical record. As already noted, however, this source of potential variation has been delimited “out” of the model. But we need not travel to other cultures to question some of these assumptions. (excerpt).